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In response to growing concerns about understanding the impact of regulation
on consumers, business, and government, the American Enterprise Institute and the
Brookings Institution have established the new AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies. The primary purpose of the center is to hold lawmakers and
regulators more accountable by providing thoughtful, objective analysis of existing
regulatory programs and new regulatory proposals. The Joint Center will build on
AEI’s and Brookings’s impressive body of work over the past three decades that
has evaluated the economic impact of regulation and offered constructive
suggestions for implementing reforms to enhance productivity and consumer
welfare. The views in Joint Center publications are those of the authors and do not



































When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues national ambient air quality
regulations, it should meet two requirements. First, the EPA should specify, to the extent
possible in quantitative terms, the range of benefits that it believes will follow from each new
rule it seeks to promulgate. It should specify as well the range of benefits that it believes would
follow from at least two alternative approaches, one stricter and one more lenient than the chosen
regulation. In the process the agency should describe the level of “residual risk” under all three
options. Second, the EPA should explain why it believes the chosen rule to be preferable to the
alternatives—that is, why the benefits to flow from the selected rule justify that rule and why the
benefits that would follow from the alternative rules, more and less stringent, fail to justify it.
If necessary, the courts should require the EPA to carry out the proposed tasks. But when
the EPA does perform these tasks, and does so reasonably, the courts should uphold the
underlying regulations.
The introduction of these changes would eliminate the need for any resurgence of interest
in the nondelegation doctrine, which should be reserved only for the most egregious cases. The
Clean Air Act is constitutional.1
Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?
Cass R. Sunstein
I. Introduction: Environmental Policy and Administrative Law
In issuing and revising national ambient air quality regulations under the Clean Air Act,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should provide a detailed “benefits analysis.” To
that end, it should undertake two tasks. First, it should specify the range of benefits that it
believes will result from the rule it seeks to promulgate, along with a specification of the range of
benefits that it believes would result from at least two alternative approaches, one stricter and
one more lenient. In the process EPA should identify the residual risk left under the competing
regulatory regimes. Second, the EPA should explain why it believes that the chosen rule is
preferable to the less and more stringent alternatives—why the set of benefits to be received
from the selected rule justify that rule, and why the set of benefits to be received from the less
and more stringent rule do not justify it. In the process it should explain why the residual risk left
by the selected rule is acceptable, while the residual risk left by the less stringent rule is not. If
necessary, reviewing courts should require the EPA to perform these tasks. If the EPA has done
so, judicial review should be at an end, and courts should uphold the EPA’s decision.
Ideas of this kind have potentially broad implications, extending well beyond the Clean
Air Act, and even the EPA, to the work of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the National Highway Traffic and Safety
Administration. If agencies undertook tasks of this kind, there would be little point to the recent
resurgence of interest in the nondelegation doctrine. The sensible impulses that underlie those
innovations—impulses that involve accountability, deliberation, and sound policymaking—can
be taken care of through other means. Taken together, judicial requirements of this kind would
constitute a form of “democracy-promoting minimalism”
1 in the distinctive context of
administrative law. These are the basic claims that I will attempt to defend in this essay.
                                                
1 See Sunstein (1999) on the general topic of judicial minimalism.2
A. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act may well be the most important of all environmental statutes. Its
effects include a range of beneficial consequences for human health and well-being and
extremely high costs on the private sector. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
estimates overall compliance costs at $0.5 trillion.
2 The act’s claim to success rests on enormous
improvements in ambient air quality and corresponding health benefits. The EPA estimates that
the act prevents at least 45,000 deaths annually and that it also prevents a minimum of 13,000
heart attacks and 7,000 annual strokes.
3 On a standard (though not undisputed) view, the benefits
of the act, ranging between $5.6 trillion and $49.4 trillion, far exceed its costs.
4
The act has nonetheless been subject to telling criticism. The foundation of clean air
regulation rests in the EPA’s issuance of nationally uniform ambient air quality standards; but in
light of the extraordinary diversity of the fifty states, it is not clear that the idea of national
standards can be rationally defended.
5 Both lower courts and the EPA seem to think that the
standard-setting process does not and cannot involve consideration of costs.
6 But does it make
sense, or is it even feasible, to say that national standards will be founded on an assessment of
benefits alone, conducted in a cost-vacuum?
7 If an improvement in ambient air quality would
produce health benefits that are small but not trivial, isn’t it clear that the improvement is
justified if compliance costs are trivial, but perhaps not if the costs are very high? There is reason
to think that, at least in some cases, an understanding of costs has affected the EPA’s decision
about appropriate standards—but that the cost-benefit balancing has been left implicit and free
from public scrutiny and review.
                                                
2 Davies and Mazurek (1997, 130).
3 Ibid. Judgments about benefits, nonmonetized but especially monetized, are highly sensitive to contentious
assumptions, and hence the “bottom line” numbers should be taken with many grains of salt. See Lutter (1998),
urging the use of plausible alternative assumptions and that EPA’s benefit calculations are inflated. See also
Heinzerling (1998), urging that cost per lives saved are inflated, also because of contentious assumptions. Though
coming from different directions, Lutter and Heinzerling both argue, convincingly, that characterization of both
benefits and costs can shift dramatically with small changes in assumptions, an argument that much bears on the
central claims of this Article. See below.
4 See Davies and Mazurek (1997, 130-147).
5 See Krier (1974).
6 See Lead Industries v. EPA, 449 U.S. 1042 (DDC 1980); American Trucking v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir.
1999).
7 See Landy, Roberts, and Thomas (1990, 49-82 and 279-83).3
Perhaps the largest question involves the criteria by which EPA decides whether one or
another level of regulation is (in the statutory phrase) “requisite to protect the public health.”
8
For most pollutants, air quality at various levels is not either “safe” or “not safe”; there are
diminishing degrees of risk associated with diminishing degrees of exposure. On what basis is a
particular level of residual risk said to be the appropriate one? What judgments do, or should,
enter into that conclusion? The EPA has been criticized for sometimes suggesting, in an
unhelpful and conclusory fashion, that it chooses the “safe” level, as if this were solely a
technocratic judgment and as if “safety” were an on-off switch, when its decision about
permissible levels rests in fact on a series of political, scientific, and economic judgments and
compromises.
There are two problems with this state of affairs. The first involves democratic
deliberation. If the EPA does not give a clear sense of the range of adverse effects, and if it does
not say why one set of such effects calls for regulation and another does not, the public is not
informed of the nature of the underlying questions. Under the EPA’s articulated position, a
purely technical issue (would a certain level be safe?) is substituted, at least publicly, for the real
and more complicated ones (what level of safety is appropriate in light of all the relevant factors?
why should one level of regulation be preferred to another?).
The second problem involves sound regulatory policy. Any proposed national standard
could be loosened or tightened, and the question is whether the agency has chosen the optimal, or
at least a reasonable, regulatory “point.” Without a clear and (to the extent possible) quantified
presentation of the expected environmental benefits of the various alternatives,
9 there can be no
assurance that the agency has chosen that point rather than one that is too strict or too lenient.
B. A Remarkable Decision and A New Doctrine
In its extraordinary decision in American Trucking Association v. EPA,
10 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit responded to this last concern in the
strongest possible terms. It held that as interpreted by the EPA, the key provisions of the Clean
                                                
8 42 USC 7409.
9 Costs are of course important too. As discussed below, the prevailing view forbids EPA from considering costs,
and my basic proposal does not challenge that prevailing view. I do, however, raise some doubts about it below.
10 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999).4
Air Act—those that give the EPA authority to issue national air quality standards—represent an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The decision announces the birth of a new
nondelegation doctrine, one with potentially large implications for regulatory policy. Under the
new doctrine, open-ended statutory terms will be invalidated unless agencies are able to specify
the governing legal criteria—to discipline their own authority through narrowing interpretations.
The new nondelegation doctrine is remarkable for at least three reasons. First, the
Supreme Court has not used the doctrine to invalidate a federal statute since (or for that matter
before) 1935,
11 and hence any such decision by a court of appeals is reasonably taken to mark a
fresh departure. Second, the new doctrine does not require Congress to legislate with clarity. It
says instead that if Congress has not been clear, agencies must act on their own, to set out limits
on their own legal authority. Third, there now appears to be a genuine doctrine in place;
American Trucking represents no isolated decision, but the culmination of a line of lower court
cases, one of which was a similar decision about the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
12 The
decision therefore signals a distinctive approach to judicial review of agency action.
The new doctrine raises a number of questions. The narrowest (though far from
unimportant) issue has to do with the fate of EPA rulemaking with respect to national ambient air
quality standards. What, if anything, can the EPA do in the future in general, or on remand in
particular? The question is significant both because of its consequences for implementation of
the Clean Air Act and because of its implications for regulatory policy in general. And what,
exactly, is the relationship between the new doctrine and ordinary judicial review to test whether
agency action has been ”arbitrary” or “capricious”? An especially large question has to do with
how American Trucking exposes continuing problems with the design and implementation of
environmental regulation as a whole and the Clean Air Act in particular, a statute whose key
provisions seem to depend on implausible assumptions, and under which EPA has sometimes
hidden crucial questions of value with uninformative platitudes.
                                                
11 See Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
12 See Industrial Union v. OSHA, 37 F.2d 605 (DC Cir. 1994).5
C. Goals and Plans
In this essay my largest goal is to understand current difficulties with environmental
policy, the Clean Air Act, and EPA promulgation of ambient air quality standards, and to see
how the EPA and reviewing courts might perform a constructive role in making things better
rather than worse. My simplest claim is that the EPA should undertake the two tasks identified
above: it should specify the range of benefits that it believes will follow from the regulation it
seeks to impose and also the residual risks, and it should explain why it believes that the chosen
regulation is preferable to the alternatives.
I have three more particular goals. The first is to evaluate the nondelegation doctrine,
both old and new, as a way of ensuring better and more transparent policy analysis by EPA and
other agencies. That issue raises large questions about democratic accountability and about the
appropriate role of courts in reviewing agency action. I suggest that although the doctrine has
considerable appeal, this is not really a nondelegation doctrine at all, and the relevant goals
would be better accomplished through a form of more conventional judicial review of agency
action. To get to the punchline: The Clean Air Act is hardly unconstitutional; it is possible to
generate an interpretation of the act that creates both “floors” and “ceilings” on agency action
while also leaving a degree of discretion to the EPA, particularly in the face of scientific
uncertainty. The exercise of that discretion should be reviewed for arbitrariness. I conclude that
the particulates and ozone standards cannot survive that review because they were not
sufficiently justified; but because they may well be justifiable, the appropriate response is not to
vacate the new regulations, but to remand without vacating, or to allow EPA to issue them as
interim rules pending a better explanation.
My second goal is to describe the appropriate role of the nondelegation doctrine in
modern public law. I claim that the doctrine is properly held in reserve for extreme cases and that
it operates as a legitimate tool of statutory construction. More importantly, I contend that the
doctrine is not so much dead as relocated. Its current home can be found not in cases invalidating
open-ended grants of authority, but in the many decisions using various principles to discipline
legislative and administrative action.
13 When courts require Congress to speak clearly in order to
authorize an agency to raise a serious constitutional problem, or to apply a statute
                                                
13 See Eskridge and Frickey (1992), for a catalogue.6
extraterritorially or retroactively, they are applying a narrower and more targeted version of the
nondelegation doctrine—a version that requires Congress to focus, with particularity, on certain
especially sensitive questions. By requiring congressional rather than merely executive
deliberation on those questions, the various “clear statement” principles operate as a
nondelegation doctrine in another guise.
My third goal is to discuss possible improvements in the operation of the Clean Air Act,
at the legislative, administrative, and judicial levels, improvements that might respond to various
concerns about EPA performance, including the concerns expressed in American Trucking. I
attempt to explain how the act seems based on the (false) assumption that pollutants generally
have “safe thresholds,” and how this assumption has seriously impaired both regulatory
policymaking and democratic deliberation. I also suggest that the act should be interpreted, or if
necessary amended, to allow and require EPA to engage in “health-health tradeoffs” and to take
account of costs in setting national standards. In particular, I emphasize that EPA should engage
in more specific and quantitative assessments of the hazardous effects of pollution at various
levels, so as to increase the transparency of its decisions. But because of the harmful side-effects
of aggressive judicial review, courts should play only a secondary and catalytic role—embodied
in certain recent and quite innovative procedural developments in administrative law, above all
the “remand without invalidation.”
II. The Clean Air Act
A. Setting National Standards
1. The key provisions. The Clean Air Act was enacted in 1970. Though many hundreds
of pages in length, some of them mind-numbingly specific and detailed, the act offers two
remarkably brief provisions designed to set the statutory program in motion.
The first of these provisions involves primary national ambient air quality standards.
Here the EPA is asked to set standards “the attainment and maintenance of which in the
judgment of the Administrator,” based on air quality criteria documents “and allowing an
adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.”
14 The second of these
                                                
14 42 USC 7409(b)(1)7
provisions involves secondary national ambient air quality standards, which the EPA must set at
levels “requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects
associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air.”
15 “Welfare” is defined to
include “effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife,
weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to
transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-being.”
16
For secondary standards, involving welfare rather than health, there is no provision for an
“adequate margin of safety.”
There are several distinctive features to these provisions. For one, they seem, at least at
first glance, not to contemplate any consideration of cost in the standard-setting process.
17
Primary standards are based on health, apparently to be assessed in a cost vacuum, while
secondary standards are based on welfare, also apparently to be assessed without regard to cost.
This is not an inevitable reading of the relevant provisions; perhaps the level “requisite to protect
the public health” and “welfare” is a function of cost, not only benefit; but the prevailing
interpretation is otherwise.
 18 Second, the standards are fully national—even though political
judgments about air quality vary greatly from state to state, and even though the effects of
improved air quality (on the cost and benefits sides) are highly variable from one state to
another. Finally, both provisions appear to contemplate the existence of “safe thresholds.” The
basic idea is that the EPA should ensure that air is “safe” and that public welfare is “protected.”
What makes this idea distinctive is its artificiality. When it is said that a certain level of pollution
is “safe,” what is really meant is that the residual risk is acceptable or tolerable—not that there is
no risk at all. Consider, for example, this commendably direct testimony from the Chair of
EPA’s Scientific Advisory Committee’s panel on ozone and particulates:
“Based on information now available, it appears that ozone may elicit a continuum of
biological responses down to background concentrations. It is critical to understand that a
biological response does not necessarily imply an adverse health effect. Nevertheless, this means
that the paradigm of selecting a standard at the lowest-observable-effects-level and then
                                                
15 42 USC 7409(b)(2).
16 42 USC 7602(h).
17 American Trucking Association confirms this reading. See 175 F.3d at 1030. For the initial holding to this effect,
see Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980).
18 Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980).8
providing an ‘adequate margin of safety’ is not possible. It further means that risk assessments
must play a central role in identifying an appropriate level.”
19
2. Problems and puzzles. All of these points have created serious difficulties for the EPA
in practice. For nonthreshold pollutants in particular, it seems both natural and sensible to assess
further reductions in terms of their cost. When benefits are highly uncertain, it is peculiar to say
that EPA cannot consider cost, especially since health gains are almost inevitable as permissible
exposure levels decline.
In light of this point, some critics have suggested that some kind of cost-benefit balancing
inevitably occurs at EPA.
20 At least publicly, EPA denies this claim. Consider Administrator
Browner’s suggestion: “Costs of meeting the standards and related factors have never been
considered in setting the national ambient air quality standards themselves. . . . [T]he focus has
been entirely on health, risk, exposure and damage to the environment. . . . And the American
public deserves to know whether the air in its cities and counties is unsafe or not; that question
should never be confused with the separate issues of how long it may take or how much it may
cost to reduce pollution to safe levels. Indeed, to allow costs and related factors to influence the
determination of what levels protect public health would be to mislead the American public in a
very fundamental way.”
21
Only insiders know for certain whether EPA does in fact consider costs in issuing
national ambient air quality standards.
22 But consider, by way of contrast and as a possible clue,
the administrator’s explanation of the 1979 revision of the ozone standard:
“The Clean Air Act, as the Administrator interprets it, does not permit him to take factors
such as cost or attainability into account in setting the standard; it is to be a standard that will
adequately protect public health. He recognizes that controlling ozone to very low levels is a task
that will have significant impact on economic and social activities. This recognition causes him
to reject as an option the setting of a zero-level standard. . . . However, it is public health, and not
economic impact, that must be the compelling factor in the decision.”
                                                
19 Woolf (1997).
20 See Eads (1985).
21 Browner (1997).
22 Some evidence is provided by the EPA’s failure to require more stringent regulation of particulates, in spite of the
fact that on the EPA’s own numbers, more stringent regulation might have provided $4 billion in increased benefits.
If this was possible, why did the EPA not require it, if not because of some cost consciousness?9
This explanation, difficult to follow though it is, is most naturally taken as suggesting that
despite the nominal irrelevance of cost, costs do matter in the context of standard-setting for
nonthreshold pollutants.
With respect to state-by-state variations, there is little question that the high costs of
attainment will, for many states, produce frequent violations of national requirements—and this
has in fact turned out to be the case.
23 The upshot is that in theory, the act requires nationally
uniform standards, but in practice, it authorizes an enormous amount of variation among states.
Finally, EPA must make hard choices about how safe is safe enough—choices that
involve not merely the facts, but also evaluative judgments about acceptable degrees of risk. A
central issue has to do with the ingredients of any judgment that a certain risk is too high. The
many important questions here include:
— The size of the population at risk
— The nature of the population at risk, e.g., whether it involves a large number of
children, whether only elderly people are affected, whether those affected have a preexisting
condition, such as asthma
— The likelihood of harm for particular members of the affected population, that is,
whether the likelihood of incurring harm is 1 in 1,000, 1 in 10,000, or 1 in 1 million
— The severity of the risk, e.g., whether it involves cancer or mortality risks, or
increased hospital admissions, bronchitis, respiratory symptoms, lost work days, or what the
EPA calls minor restricted activity days (MRADs)
It is clear that the EPA considers all of these questions in issuing national standards. But EPA
has developed no clear guidelines to discipline its judgment about when one or another level of
regulation is appropriate. It has not said, for example, that if 100,000 people face a cancer risk of
1/1,000, regulation is presumptively desirable, but if 10,000 face a 1/1,000 chance of minor
respiratory problems, regulation is presumptively not desirable.
One final note: An obvious and important question has to do with the distributional
effects of national ambient air quality standards. Who bears the costs? Who receives the
benefits? Full information is not available. But an early study finds that poor people, and
                                                
23 There are many discussions. See, e.g., Eads (1985); and Henderson and Pearson (1978).10
African-Americans, are net gainers, whereas wealthy people, and whites, are net losers
24—
perhaps not a shocking finding in light of the fact that many of the adverse effects of air pollution
are concentrated in large cities. It is reasonable to question the idea that relatively well-off
people, and whites, are losers on balance; but insofar as the study shows substantial net gains for
the poor, it seems on solid ground.
B. Revising National Standards
In 1971, EPA issued six national standards, governing ozone, particulates, carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulates 2.5 (particulates of a special size). In 1978, EPA
issued a seventh standard, involving lead; it did so as a result of a court order. These seven
regulations amount to the centerpiece of EPA’s regulatory system for the control of national
ambient air quality.
Of course it would be extremely surprising if the standards originally adopted in 1971
and 1978 turn out to survive new scientific evidence, and many people have urged that
adjustments are desirable. Congress has thus created an “agency-forcing” mechanism designed to
require EPA reconsideration of primary and secondary standards. Under the act, EPA is required
to review the relevant criteria and standards at least once every five years, and to revise them “as
25 EPA is specifically required to consider, and to
explain any significant departures from, the recommendations of CASAC, an independent
committee established specifically to advise the administrators on air quality criteria and
standards.
26
So much for the statutory requirements. The possibility of litigation raises further
complexities. The most general point is that EPA is highly vulnerable to suits both by those
seeking more stringent controls and new regulations based on apparent evidence of hazards at
existing levels. If EPA does not act within the statutory period, or if it decides not to impose
more stringent controls, it will predictably be faced by a suit from an environmental
organization, that, in view of likely scientific evidence, has a nontrivial chance of success. This
is so especially in light of a recent judicial suggestion that the administrator may be barred from
                                                
24 See Peskin (1978).
25 42 USC 7409(d)(1).11
declining “to establish a margin of safety in the face of documented adverse health effects.”
27
But the EPA is also highly vulnerable to challenges by industry whenever it tightens a standard.
Creative lawyers have a quite good chance of successfully challenging an EPA regulation
whether it has tightened, or refused to tighten, existing standards. The basic point is that the
centrality of litigation to environmental protection creates a new form of tyranny of the status
quo—a great deal of inertia in favor of the existing regulatory framework, whatever its content.
C. The Record
Thus far it might be tempting to be quite skeptical of the act—to think that it rests on
false assumptions, that it foolishly ignores costs and state-by-state variations, and that it is an
extremely crude foundation for regulatory policy. There is considerable sense in these skeptical
reactions. But it must also be acknowledged that many reasonable observers believe the act has
done a great deal of good – indeed, that reductions in air pollution can plausibly be counted
among the substantial success stories in regulatory government in the last half-century.
28 The
good news is that for all of the pollutants, there have been large improvements in ambient air
quality. Consider the following table:
Table 1. Air Quality and Emissions Trends 1986-95.
Air quality change (%) Emissions change (%)
Carbon monoxide -37 -16
Lead -78 -32
Nitrogen dioxide -14  -3  (nitrogen oxides)
Ozone -6 -9 (VOCs)
PM-10* -22 -17
Sulfur dioxide -37 -18
*PM-10 changes are based on 1988-95 data
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1996. National Air Quality and Emissions Trends Report, 1995.
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards Research. EPA 454/R-96-005. Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina; p. 1.
                                                                                                                                                            
26 Ibid. 7409 (d)(2(B), 7607 (d)(3).
27 Ibid. p. 393, leaving the issue undecided on the ground that the administrator did not adequately explain her
judgment that no public health threat exists.
28 See, e.g., Easterbrook (1995, 181-83).12
Indeed, the cost-benefit ratio appears to be quite good, at least according to most studies.
A general review contains many criticisms of American efforts at environmental protection but
concludes that “the benefits of the Clean Air Act seem clearly to outweigh the costs.”
29 Thus, a
study of the EPA rule between 1990 and 1995 found that the costs outweighed the benefits by no
less than $70 billion.
30 But better tools could have produced similar results at a far lower cost.
Thus, there is evidence that with better tools, especially economic incentives, EPA could have
achieved the same benefits at one-quarter of the costs. There is also a problem of poor priority-
setting. EPA’s own studies suggest that it is not devoting resources to the most serious problems
and indeed that inadequate priority-setting is a particular problem for clean air regulation, where
large problems (such as indoor air pollution) receive relatively little attention.
31
D. Particulates and Ozone: At EPA
The origins of the new particulates standards can be found, notably, not in an independent
decision by the EPA, but in a 1993 suit by the American Lung Association, which sought to
compel EPA to complete its review of the PM standard. The district court ordered EPA to issue a
proposed rule by November 29, 1996, and a final rule by July 18, 1997. In its defense of its final
regulation, the EPA emphasized “significant new evidence,” above all an extensive body of
epidemiological evidence on exposure to ambient PM.
The final rules were based on a massive amount of evidence, involving thousands of
pages of documents. Here are some of the highlights. I report them because they have not only
particular but also broad interest, raising recurring issues about standard-setting in the
environmental arena.
1. A general review of the evidence suggests that there would be both high benefits
and high costs from the new particulates standard. For the new ozone standard, both costs and
benefits would be significantly lower. EPA offered a great deal of detail about the harms
apparently caused by particulates and ozone at existing levels. It also acknowledged uncertainties
in the evidence. There are extensive discussions of the scientific literature.
                                                
29 Davies and Mazurek (1997, 31).
30 Ibid.13
2. EPA ultimately chose a standard of 15/65 for particulates—more specifically, an
annual standard, for PM sub2.5, of 15 mg/m3, based on the three-year average of annual
arithmetic PM sub2.5 concentrations, alongside an hourly standard of 65 mg/m3, based on the
three-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour PM sub2.5 concentrations. EPA set a .08
standard for ozone, meaning a maximum of .08 ppm averaged over an eight-hour period,
replacing the previous 0.12 ppm standard, averaged over a one-hour period. In an illustrative
comment, Administrator Browner publicly defended the 0.08 ppm standard for ozone “because,
though it is in the middle of the range recommended for consideration by CASAC and the EPA
staff paper, as a policy choice it reflects the lowest level recommended by individual CASAC
panel members and it is the lowest level tested and shown to cause effects in controlled human-
exposure health studies.”
32 In its explanation of the final rules, the EPA did not defend these
selections against plausible alternatives. The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), required by
Executive Order 12866, also discusses a more stringent and a less stringent alternative—
particulates standards of 16/65 and 15/50, and ozone standards of 0.08 5th max and 0.08 3rd
max. This discussion was designed to give a sense of the cost and benefits of the alternatives.
3. The EPA’s own public justification is extremely long and detailed but in
important respects vague and conclusory. It is filled with legalistic arguments, with reports on
specific studies having unclear implications for the particular issue of what standard to select,
and with qualitative judgments that leave a great deal of uncertainty about the magnitude of the
effects.
4. The heart of the EPA’s analysis is as follows.
 33 (I discuss particulates as an
illustration.) The EPA begins by referring to “the greatly expanded body of community
34 This evidence shows a range of adverse health effects, including
premature mortality; and there is also evidence that children, the elderly, and asthmatics are most
vulnerable to these effects. More particular evidence emerges from quantitative risk estimates
from two “example cities,” estimates that include a judgment that existing standards create
                                                                                                                                                            
31 Davies and Mazurek (1997, 24-30).
32 See Browner (1997).
33 62 Fed Reg. 38652 (1997).
34 Ibid. p. 38655.14
residual risks of “hundreds of premature deaths each year, hundreds to thousands of respiratory-
related hospital admissions, and tens of thousands of additional respiratory-related symptoms in
children.”
35 In an inadvertently hilarious qualification, the EPA adds that the “epidemiological
findings cannot be wholly attributed to inappropriate or incorrect statistical methods,
misspecification of concentration-effect models, biases in study design or implementation,
measurement errors” and the like. But the EPA adds that the results “should be interpreted
cautiously” and should be taken to “provide ample reason to be concerned that there are
detectable health effects attributable to PM at levels below the current NAAQS.”
36
5. The EPA’s basic claim is that “the increase in relative risk is small for the most
serious outcomes” but “significant from an overall public health perspective, because of the large
number of individuals in sensitive populations that are exposed to ambient air  pollution as well
as the significance of the health effects involved.”
37 International evidence, and evaluations by
over 1,000 experts, supported the view that the existing standard was insufficiently protective.
Much of the EPA’s discussion involves the fact that existing evidence does not reveal
mechanisms to explain the range of reported adverse effects. And frequently the EPA repeats
what appears to be a key phrase, almost a mantra, to the effect that the data “provides the basis
for decisions on standard levels that would reduce risk sufficiently to protect public health with
an adequate margin of safety, recognizing that such standards will not be risk-free.”
38
6. To the EPA’s credit, it does offer a discussion of less stringent and more stringent
alternatives.
39 But the discussion is quite brief, especially considering the centrality of the
comparative question. As against the less stringent possibilities, EPA says that “despite well
recognized uncertainties, the consistency and coherence of the epidemiological evidence and the
seriousness of the health effects require a more protective response.”
40 As against those who
argued for more stringent regulation, EPA says that “the inherent scientific uncertainties are too
great” and also that such regulation “might result in regulatory programs that go beyond those
                                                
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. p. 38656.
37 Ibid. p. 38657.
38 Ibid. p. 38665.
39 Ibid. p. 38674-77.
40 Ibid. p. 38665.15
that are needed to effectively reduce risks to public health.”
41 Studies “provide some suggestion
of risks extending to lower concentrations, but they do not provide a sufficient basis for
establishing a lower annual standard level.”
42 Because this point is so important, it is worthwhile
noting that the EPA spoke in similar terms for ozone, saying that more stringent regulation
would produce more “certain . . . effects, [that] while judged to be adverse, are transient and
reversible, and the more serious effects, with greater immediate and potential long-term impacts
on health are less certain, both as to the percentage of individuals exposed to various
concentrations who are likely to experience such effects and as to the long-term significance of
these effects.”
43
7. Hence any reader is likely to be puzzled about exactly why EPA chose the
particular regulations it did—about why it did not regulate either somewhat more or somewhat
less. A special puzzle is why the EPA did not impose more stringent controls on particulates; the
Regulatory Impact Analysis shows that a more stringent regulation would have produced $4
billion in increased health benefits. The problem is not that the EPA was careless or off-hand; its
exhaustive documentation was anything but that. The problem is that in the explanation
accompanying the final rules, EPA did not attempt to quantify the risks under competing
standards, nor did it show the basic value judgment that would deem one risk too high, another
risk acceptable, and another risk too low (that is, below the level requisite to protect the public
health.)
8. By far the most informative document is the RIA. Here is some of what the RIA
says:
a) The new particulates regulation would prevent 350 annual mortalities; 6,800 cases
of chronic bronchitis; 1,100 cases of acute bronchitis; about 1,200 hospital admissions, from,
for example, congestive heart failure (130) and respiratory problems (470 cases); 106,000
lost work days; and 879,000 minor restricted activity days.
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b) For the selected ozone standard, it finds that the new regulation would prevent 0–
80 deaths; 130 emergency department visits for asthma; 29,840 acute respiratory symptoms;
0–530 chronic bronchitis cases; 0–20 hospital admissions for congestive heart failure; 0–
50,440 lost work days; 0–420,300 minor restricted activity days. (Note that in both cases the
RIA specifies a range, which is a tribute to candor in the midst of scientific uncertainty.)
c) All these benefits are monetized: $4.8 million per life saved; $120,000 per life-
year saved; $12,700 per respiratory illness; $16,600 per congestive heart failure for those
over 65; $9,000 for emergency department visits for asthma; $260,000 for chronic bronchitis;
$83 per lost work day; $38 per minor restricted activity day.
d) The overall cost benefit analysis shows, for the health regulation of ozone in
2010, benefits of $0.4 billion (low-end estimate) to $2.1 billion (high-end estimate), and
costs of $1.1 billion. For particulates, the benefits range from $19 billion to $104 billion,
whereas the costs are anticipated to be $8.6 billion. A noteworthy point is that the ozone rule
might have negative net benefits of –$0.7 billion if the low-end estimate is correct; note also
that if the health benefits of ground-level ozone (discussed below) are included in the
calculation, the negative net benefits—or more simply net costs—of the rule are higher still.
(In an unfortunate typographical error in the crucial table, the net benefits are described as
$0.7 billion–$1.0 billion, rather than $-0.7 billion–$1.0 billion.
44)
e) The RIA also suggests the costs and benefits of the two alternatives. The more
stringent particulates standard would have high-end benefits of $108 billion and costs of $9.4
billion; the less stringent would have high-end benefits of $90 billion and costs of $5.5
billion. The less stringent ozone standard would have high-end benefits of $1.6 billion and
costs of $0.9 billion; the more stringent would have high-end benefits of $2.9 billion and
costs of $1.4 billion. The most noteworthy point here is that by the EPA’s own accounting,
the more stringent particulates standard would have produced $4 billion in greater benefits
(on the high-end estimate). This would seem to count as a substantial improvement in public
health, especially considering the fact that each life is valued at $4.8 million; translated into
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lives, the more stringent regulation would prevent more than 200 additional deaths each year.
EPA did not square this conclusion with its decision not to choose more stringent regulation.
Indeed, it seems clear that EPA’s own calculations showed that a tighter particulates standard
would have produced far greater health benefits than the ozone standard. That leaves a
serious unexplained anomaly in the two standards taken together.
45
f) A serious gap in the RIA is that it does not give low-end estimates for the benefits
associated with the alternatives; only high-end estimates are given for these. For the options
actually chosen, a range is specified, which greatly assists assessment of the EPA’s
judgment. But without the range, it is hard to compare the options not chosen. An additional
problem, reflected in the EPA’s explanation as a whole, is the absence of a detailed
assessment—even a wholly benefits-based assessment—of why the options that were chosen
were deemed superior to those that were not chosen.
Possible general conclusions would be that the particulates regulation promises
significant benefits, that the ozone regulation promises relatively small benefits, and that the
agency has not explained, in concrete terms, why it chose one level of regulation rather than
another. Now let us shift to the nondelegation issue.
III. The Path of the Law
A. The Old Nondelegation Doctrine: One Good Year
Despite its infrequent use, the old nondelegation doctrine should be quite familiar. In a
nutshell, it requires Congress to state an “intelligible principle” by which to guide and limit
agency action.
46 The motivating idea is that Article I, section 1, vests legislative power in the
Congress and that this vesting cannot be waived, even if Congress and the public want to do so.
If Congress gives the executive a “blank check,” or states no intelligible principle, it has violated
Article I.
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According to a standard view, the nondelegation doctrine was a core part of the original
Constitution, and its abandonment, in the aftermath of the New Deal, represented a kind of
capitulation to perceived national needs. I believe that the Constitution does contain a
nondelegation doctrine; but the standard view is much too simple. For one thing, there is no
express nondelegation doctrine in the text of the Constitution, which must therefore be counted
ambiguous on the point. To be sure, legislative power is vested in Congress, and it is reasonable
to infer that the power thus vested cannot be given to someone else. But there is no clear textual
barrier to delegations, and in fact there is no explicit evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the
original Constitution believed that it contained a nondelegation doctrine.
47 Actually, the early
practice suggested considerable willingness to “delegate” authority. In the very first year of the
Republic, Congress gave the president the power to grant licenses to trade with the Indian tribes
“under such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe.”
48 The first Congress also
provided for military pensions “under such regulations as the President of the United States may
49 In neither case did Congress issue standards by which to limit the president’s
discretion.
The standard view also fits uncomfortably with judicial practice. It is often remarked that
the Supreme Court last used the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a federal statute in 1935.
What is less often remarked is that the Court first used the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a
federal statute in exactly the same year. While earlier cases had suggested the existence of a
nondelegation doctrine,
50 the Court upheld a number of broad delegations,
51 and hence for the
first 138 years of the nation’s existence—as well as the past 64 years—no Supreme Court
decision struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds. Let us briefly explore the two
decisions of 1935, the nondelegation doctrine’s only good year.
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In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
52 the Court invalidated a section of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, saying that “the President is authorize to prohibit the transportation in
interstate commerce” of oil priced in violation of state-imposed production quotas. The Court
said that the defect lay in the absence of standards specifying exactly when the President was to
exercise this power. This is a controversial ruling, fitting poorly with post–World War II
decisions,
53 and it is most unlikely that the Court would follow it today. But the largest decision,
one that has not been overruled even implicitly, was Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States,
54
where the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act as a whole. In invalidating the
act, the Court made three critical points. First, the Court stressed that the statutory standards were
open-ended and self-contradictory—no constraint at all on government approval of “codes.”
Second, the Court said that the act essentially delegated public power to private groups. It was
especially troublesome to tell private persons to create law in their preferred form. Because
accountable officials did not “filter” efforts at private lawmaking, this did not merely raise the
spectre of faction, it was the thing itself—the cooptation of public power by self-interested
private groups. Third, and in a discussion of particular relevance to the general subject here, the
Court distinguished other statutes, most notably the Federal Trade Commission Act, partly by
reference to the procedural safeguards provided by those statutes. “What are ‘unfair methods of
competition’ are thus to be determined in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of
particular competitive conditions and of what is found to be a specific and substantial public
interest. To make this possible, Congress set up a special procedure.”
55 As we will see, the seeds
of the new nondelegation doctrine can be found in this passage.
In the decades since Schechter Poultry, however, nondelegation challenges have been
routinely repudiated.
56 Indeed, the Court has upheld some apparently extreme grants of authority
to the executive branch.
57 But there have been a few conflicting signals. In the most visible
opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Occupational Safety and Health Act should be
struck down on nondelegation grounds.
58 In Industrial Union Department v. American
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Petroleum Institute,
59 better known as the Benzene case, the basic question was whether the act
called for (a) cost-benefit balancing (as urged in a concurrence by Justice Powell), (b)
demonstration that any regulated risk be “significant” (as urged in the plurality opinion of four
justices, written by Justice Stevens), or (c) agency action whenever there was any risk at all (as
urged in a dissenting opinion of four justices, written by Justice Marshall). In Justice Rehnquist’s
view, Congress had made no choice among the three alternatives. The statute was therefore an
unconstitutional delegation. Justice Rehnquist contended that the statute was a kind of “mirage,”
in which Congress “simply avoid[ed] a choice which was both fundamental for purposes of the
statute and yet politically so divisive that the necessary decision or compromise was difficult, if
not impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge.”
60
Notably, Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion also referred to the nondelegation doctrine,
not to invalidate the act but as a tool of statutory construction.
61 In the plurality’s view, the
agency’s position would allow the agency such massive power over the private sector as to be a
possibly unconstitutional delegation of power. Partly for this reason, the Court read the statute to
require OSHA to show a “significant risk” before it could undertake regulation. For the plurality,
then, the nondelegation doctrine operated as a kind of clear statement principle, requiring
Congress to speak unambiguously if it sought to give (what the Court saw as) open-ended
authority to administrators. Note, however, that the Court left the definition of the key term—
“significant risk”—to the agency, and that OSHA has yet to give a rule-like understanding of that
highly ambiguous term.
62
B. What, If Anything, Is The Nondelegation Doctrine For?
The opinions of Justice Rehnquist and the plurality in the Benzene Case have spurred
renewed interest in the nondelegation doctrine, and many have argued on behalf of a revival.
63
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There has thus been a spirited debate over what purposes such a revival would serve, and
whether, in light of those purposes, a revival would be justified.
64
It is possible to isolate several possibilities. First and foremost, the doctrine is designed to
promote a distinctive kind of accountability—the kind of accountability that comes from
requiring specific decisions from a deliberative body reflecting the views of representatives from
various states of the union. This is hardly to say that the executive branch lacks accountability; of
course the president is subject to the will of people. But the nondelegation doctrine might be
associated with the particular constitutional goal of ensuring a deliberative democracy, one that
involves not only accountability but also reflectiveness. The vesting of lawmaking power in
Congress is designed to ensure the combination of deliberation and accountability that comes
from saying that government power cannot be brought to bear on individuals unless diverse
representatives, from diverse places, have managed to agree on the details.
A closely related point has to do with the extent to which law, and particularly national
legislation, can amount to an infringement on liberty. If no law may be brought to bear against
the public unless diverse members of Congress have been able to agree on a particular form of
words, then perhaps there is an important safeguard of freedom. The underlying idea is that
people may not be subject to national legal constraints unless and until there has been specific
legislative authorization for the constraints. The nondelegation doctrine also promotes rule-of-
law values. It does this, first, by promoting planning by those subject to law, by giving them a
sense of what is permitted and what is forbidden. It does this, second, by cabining the
discretionary authority of enforcement officials, who might otherwise act abusively or
capriciously. In all these ways the nondelegation doctrine might be seen as a safeguard against
the framers’ core concerns, self-interested representation and factional power.
Those who challenge the doctrine emphasize several points. Part of their concern is
institutional, involving judicial competence rather than the doctrine on its merits.
65 The
difference between a permissible and impermissible delegation—between “legislative” and
“executive” conduct—is one of degree, not one of kind. From what has been said thus far, it
should be clear that the line involves not anything qualitative but the precise amount of delegated
discretion, and there is no simple metric to tell how much discretion is too much. It is for this
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reason that Justice Scalia, among others, has urged that the nondelegation is largely
unenforceable by the federal judiciary, simply because it is not subject to principled judicial
application.
66 If understood in these terms, the doctrine might be taken as a judicially
underenforced constitutional norm—but a constitutional norm nonetheless.
These are largely institutional points; but other objections cut deeper against the doctrine.
Sometimes Congress has good reasons to delegate. It may lack relevant information, not only
about particulates and ozone, but about the social consequences of one or another approach to
regulation. It may also be aware of the existence of changing circumstances, which may make
any particular approach increasingly anachronistic. For a multimember body, there are serious
problems in achieving closure on any particular course of action, and the result can be to push
law in the direction of incompletely specified abstractions. These points are independent of the
phenomenon of delegating to escape the political consequences of specificity, a phenomenon that
undoubtedly plays a large role as well.
The latter point is often taken as a reason for invigorating the nondelegation doctrine in
the name of accountability; but Jerry Mashaw has urged that administrators should be making
political decisions precisely on grounds of accountability.
67 As he notes, agencies are themselves
politically accountable through their relationship to the president. Indeed, public choice theory
may well suggest that Congress is more, not less, susceptible to factional power than bureaucrats
acting under the arm of the president. In any case the issue cannot be resolved in the abstract.
And there is an empirical point here. It is not clear that from any point of view, things have gone
systematically better when Congress is clear than when Congress is not. If we ask about
promoting public welfare, or about agency reputation for competence and fair-dealing, it appears
unimportant to know whether Congress has spoken with clarity. The Interstate Commerce
Commission, for example, was one of the least well respected agencies, and it operated under
open-ended statutory terms; the Securities and Exchange Commission is highly regarded, though
its organic statute is similarly open-ended. The Department of Agriculture is one of the least
well-regarded agencies, and the statutes it administers are frequently all too clear. The Internal
Revenue Service is highly regarded, and many of the provisions that it must enforce are highly
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detailed. In short, there seems to be no link between clear statutory terms and agency
competence or agency contribution to social well-being.
Thus, it might be questioned whether a reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine
would be a sensible response to any of the problems and pathologies of the modern
administrative state. Indeed, it would be foolish to suggest that such a revival would ensure
better regulatory policy, or even that it would mark a significant improvement in terms of
democratic values. But it would be almost equally foolish to suggest that the nondelegation
doctrine deserves to play no role at all in the constitutional regime. Contrary to Mashaw’s
apparent suggestion, administrators are often weakly accountable to the president (or the
electorate), and, in any case, Congress has a distinctive kind of accountability, and it is that kind
of accountability that leads to its role as the institution entrusted with the making of federal law.
The Constitution would not tolerate a legislative grant of authority to the president to enact such
environmental regulations as he deemed best, even though it is not clear that such a grant would
lead to inferior environmental policies. The special form of political accountability anticipated
by Article I, section 1, does call for limitations on executive discretion. As we shall see, this
requirement is best promoted by clear statement principles—the real place where contemporary
American law recognizes a nondelegation doctrine, and where that doctrine now flourishes—and
also by judicial invalidation in the rare cases where even aggressive statutory construction is able
to identify neither floors nor ceilings.
IV. The New Nondelegation Doctrine
A. Kenneth Culp Davis’s Interesting Innovation
Beginning with an important essay in 1969,
68 Kenneth Culp Davis proposed a new
approach to the nondelegation doctrine. In its original form, he claimed, the doctrine was dead,
and quite properly so. Congress could not be expected to legislate specifically, and it should not
be asked to do so. But much of the doctrine could be rescued and could perform a salutary
function, if agencies could be required to develop protections against uncontrolled discretionary
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power and to adhere to them. “The key should no longer be statutory words; it should be the
protections that administrators in fact provide, irrespective of what the statutes say or fail to
say.”
69 Thus, Davis urged “a much broader requirement, judicially enforced, that as far as is
practicable administrators must structure their discretionary power through appropriate
safeguards and must confine and guide their discretionary power through standards, principles,
and rules.”
70 Davis thus argued for a proposed shift from a requirement of statutory clarity to a
requirement of administrative clarity.
B. The (Early) Fate of An Idea
It is not clear to what extent subsequent judicial developments were actually influenced
by Davis’s suggestion. But it is clear that in the 1970s, a number of cases required administrators
to generate rules and criteria, and several such cases seemed to adopt an approach quite close to
that proposed by Davis.
71 But by far the most prominent use of the idea came in Judge
Leventhal’s opinion in the celebrated case upholding the wage-and-price-freeze statute,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally.
72
The remarkably broad statutory provision at issue authorized the president “to issue such
orders and regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wage and salaries at
levels not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970.”
73 Thus, Congress essentially gave no
guidance to the president, at least not in the text of the statute. A key part of Judge Leventhal’s
response—and a somewhat desperate one under the circumstances—was to suggest that there
was a requirement that the executive develop “subsidiary” administrative law, and stick to it.
Thus, a “feature that blunts the ‘blank check’ rhetoric is the requirement that any action taken by
the Executive under the law, subsequent to the freeze, must be in accordance with further
standards as developed by the Executive.” This requirement was said to be “inherent in the Rule
of Law and implicit in the Act.” Judge Leventhal emphasized the “requirement of subsidiary
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administrative policy, enabling Congress, the courts, and the public to assess the Executive’s
adherence to the ultimate legislative standard.” In his view, “there is an ongoing requirement of
intelligible administrative policy that is corollary to and implementing of the legislature’s
C. The Rise of the New Nondelegation Doctrine
Amalgamated Meat Cutters came to enjoy a rebirth, and also to be understood differently,
in an extremely important case, International Union, UAW v. OSHA.
74 The case involved a large-
scale regulatory effort by OSHA to protect workers, by “lock-outs” and by informational “tags,”
from the hazards of energy released from industrial machinery. To simplify a complex story, the
regulation at issue required employers to place a “lock” on energy-isolating devices connected to
the equipment, or, if the equipment could not be locked or if another approach were equally
effective, to place a warning “tag” on the energy-isolating device, saying that employees should
not operate the device until the tag is removed.
The only governing statutory language was remarkably brief. It said that OSHA should
issue regulations “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or heathful employment
and places of employment.”
75 The first question was the meaning of this apparently open-ended
statutory term OSHA said that this language required it to regulate (a) any “significant risk” to
(b) the point of “feasibility,” that is, to the point where compliance would not be feasible for the
industry, either technologically or economically.
76 In this way, OSHA interpreted the
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” language in a way quite similar to the interpretation of the
statute insofar as it governed toxic substances in the Benzene Case.
77
The court said that as the agency had interpreted the statute, the agency had free wheeling
authority in individual cases to go from “no standard at all” to “adopting the most stringent
78 In the court’s view, the statute, so interpreted, might well violate the
nondelegation doctrine. Hence, the court remanded the case to the agency in order to give it an
opportunity to adopt an interpretation that would be both “reasonable and consistent with the
                                                
74 938 F.2d 1310 (DC Cir. 1991).
75 29 USC 652(8).
76 938 F.2d at 1315.
77 See above.26
nondelegation doctrine.”
79 Clearly the court, or at least Judge Williams, wanted the agency to use
cost-benefit analysis as the basis for decision, but it did not require that approach. What is
noteworthy here is that the court borrowed the Amalgamated Meat Cutters idea, requiring
agencies to discipline their own discretion through “subsidiary administrative policy,” so as to
hold an agency construction invalid unless it sufficiently limits agency discretion.
On remand, the agency added to its “significant risk” and ”feasibility” constraints three
different points: (1) the standard must use the most cost-effective protective measures; (2) the
agency must publish an explanation of why any standard differing from an existing national
consensus standard would better promote the purposes of of the act; and (3) the agency must
support its chioce of standard with record evidence and explain any inconsistency with prior
agency practice. The agency added that when it identified any significant risk, it must provide “a
high degree of worker protection,” and would not be allowed to do “nothing at all.”
80 Thus, the
agency attempted to meet the court’s challenge by suggesting that on any showing of evidence of
harm, there were clear ceilings and floors to discipline agency discretion.
With evident ambivalence, the court concluded that this was sufficient to satisfy the
nondelegation doctrine.
81 The court said that as construed by the agency, its statutory authority
for regulation in general would be quite close to its authority for toxic substances, which did not
violate the nondelegation doctrine. In both cases, an agency must choose a “high degree of
worker protection” once it finds a “significant risk,” and it could not regulate past the point of
“feasibility.” Even though these notions left a degree of residual discretion, the agency was not
given a blank check, and hence the statute was acceptable as construed. The question left by the
court’s decision was whether its invocation of the nondelegation doctrine was a kind of sport, or
whether it signalled a broader development in administrative law.
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D. Particulates and Ozone in Court
The EPA’s regulations of particulates and ozone were challenged on a wide variety of
grounds.
82 The most ambitious of the challenges, based on Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
International Union, was a claim that the EPA’s construction of the act resulted in an
unconstitutional delegation of power. In a remarkable decision, the court of appeals agreed.
83
The court’s analysis was similar to that in International Union. As the court noted, “the
only concentration for ozone and PM that is utterly risk-free, in the sense of direct health
impacts, is zero.” The problem was therefore that the EPA lacks “any determinate criterion for
drawing lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too much.” To be sure, the EPA
pointed to some relevant considerations: the nature and severity of the adverse health effects, the
size of the sensitive population at risk, and the degree of uncertainties involved. The court
thought it perfectly sensible to point to these considerations. The problem is that they “do not
themselves speak to the issue of degree.” On the court’s view, “EPA’s formulation of its policy
judgment leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair below the concentrations
yielding London’s killer fog.”
With respect to particulates, the EPA defended its shift from the existing level of 0.09 to
0.08 on the ground that more people are exposed to more serious effects at 0.09 than at 0.08. But
a shift to 0.07 would be still more effective in decreasing exposure levels, and “EPA never
contradicts the intuitive proposition, confirmed by data in its Staff Paper, that reducing the
standard to that level would bring about comparable changes.” Hence, the EPA’s rationale
pointed to no disciplining criteria. To be sure, the EPA said that a reduction to 0.07 would
produce more transient and reversible effects, and the more serious effects would be less certain
at that level. But this “seems to be nothing more than a statement that lower exposure levels are
associated with lower risk to public health.” The fact that the EPA finds less severe and more
speculative effects at lower levels shows only that “the agency rightly recognizes that the
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question is one of degree, but offers no intelligible principle by which to identify a stopping
point.”
In the most ambitious part of the opinion, the court said that in order for the EPA to make
rational decisions, it must be necessary to “assign weights” to a “range of ailments short of
death.” The court referred with some approval to apparent decisions suggesting “some readiness
to adopt standards that leave non-zero residual risk,” as, for example, by using clinical criteria to
decide what counts “as an adverse health effect.” The court emphasized that “a one-size-fits-all
criterion of probability would make little sense.” 
continuously from high to low: the possible effects of pollutants vary from deaths to trivialities,
and the size of the affected population, the probability of an effect, and the associated uncertainty
range from 'large' ’numbers of persons with point estimates of high probability, to small numbers
and vague ranges of probability." The court added, “Nonetheless, an agency wielding the power
over American life possessed by EPA should be capable of developing the rough equivalent of a
generic unit of harm that takes into account population affected, severity, and probability.”
The court referred in this regard to the approach used by Oregon in devising a health plan
for poor people. Oregon has used the notion of “quality-adjusted life years” to assess health
gains, and a similar approach might be used to assess health risks. Hence, the Court held that the
regulations, as justified, were unlawful; but it left undecided the question whether they should be
vacated, an issue addressed below.
V. Evaluating the New Nondelegation Doctrine
A. Is This a Nondelegation Doctrine at All?
1. The appeal of the new doctrine: surrogate safeguards. The new nondelegation doctrine
has unquestionable appeal, and in one respect, it has long historic roots. To see why this is so,
consider the posture of a court presented with a statute that may or may not amount to an
unconstitutional delegation. If the statute contains open-ended terms, but also requires agencies
to act only after fulfilling elaborate procedural requirements, the nondelegation concern appears
to be diminished. As emphasized in Schechter Poultry, the procedures serve as surrogate
safeguards.29
The innovation in Industrial Union and American Trucking is to treat the notion of
agency self-constraint not as a shield but as a sword—to suggest that if an agency has not
engaged in self-binding via clear, articulable standards, the nondelegation doctrine has been
violated. An approach of this kind might well increase the consistency and intelligibility of
administrative policy, and it might make agency decisions more reflective and even, on balance,
better.
2. Problems. There are, however, serious problems here; taken together, they amount to
decisive objections to the new nondelegation doctrine.
(a) Administrative rather than legislative lawmaking. If a statute creates a genuine
nondelegation problem, why would an administrative construction eliminate it? The
fundamental point of the nondelegation doctrine is to ensure legislative rather than
administrative judgments about the content of federal law. It seems odd to say that a statute
violates the nondelegation doctrine because of how it has been construed by the relevant
agency. It is one thing for a court, eager not to overstep its constitutional role, to rescue a
statute from nondelegation attack by saying that the agency has construed the statute in such
a way as to reduce risks of arbitrary judgment. It is another thing for a court to invalidate a
statute on nondelegation grounds with the thought that the agency has failed to construe the
statute with sufficient clarity. This idea converts the nondelegation doctrine into something
else altogether—a general requirement of administrative transparency, a requirement with no
obvious constitutional foundation.
(b) Reinterpretation and discretion. Perhaps the American Trucking court’s answer is
that an agency interpretation can confine administrative discretion and in that way, at least,
promote some of the purposes of the doctrine, rooted in rule-of-law values, including
transparency. But there is oddity here too. Under Chevron,84 agencies are permitted to
construe ambiguous statutory terms, and no agency interpretation is set in stone. Suppose that
in International Union—the lockout-tagout case—a future OSHA accepted the court’s
explicit invitation and decided that cost-benefit analysis would be the basis for regulatory
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judgments. Would this be unlawful? Surely not. And if not—if the agency is entitled to
reinterpret the statute in its (reasoned) discretion—then how, exactly, does one agency
construction avoid a nondelegation problem?
(c) Institutional difficulties and very slippery slopes. There is also a serious problem
of judicial role. Judge Leventhal used the idea as a basis for permitting a consensual
arrangement between Congress and the executive branch; the effort was to find a way to
validate the statute while also giving a signal to the executive. The notion that open-ended
statutes become unconstitutional unless accompanied by agency specification would entail a
far larger judicial role. Indeed, that role would extend far beyond the setting of regulate of
particulates and ozone. Consider the following:
— It would raise serious constitutional doubts about most and perhaps all of the rest
of EPA’s national primary and secondary standards. None of those standards was issued with
a clear statement of the criteria that would mark the line between permitted and prohibited
exposure levels.
— It could well raise questions about the activities of other agencies, such as the
Federal Communications Commission, that operate pursuant to vague statutory terms. Note
that the FCC is permitted to give out licenses in accordance with “public interest,
convenience, and necessity.” What must the FCC say in order to discipline the exercise of its
own authority?
— It would raise constitutional questions about OSHA’s use of the “significant risk”
idea. We have seen that in the Benzene Case, the Court said that OSHA must show that any
risk that it seeks to regulate qualifies as “significant.” No one seems to think that serious
delegation issues are raised by the existence of administrative discretion to decide when a
risk so qualifies, notwithstanding the Supreme Court plurality’s anticipation that this
judgment would be made administratively. Plainly it would not suffice for an agency simply
to announce that it deems a certain risk to be significant. But how can an agency distinguish
between significant and insignificant risks? Lower courts and OSHA have given some
guidance, but not a great deal. Under the American Trucking ruling, this raises serious
constitutional problems.31
— It would raise serious constitutional problems about statutes that require agencies
to engage in cost-benefit balancing, because those statutes typically do not contain anything
like an accompanying theory of valuation. Two especially prominent statutes—the Toxic
Substances Control Act and the Fungicide, Insecticide, and Pesticide Act—require the
agency to regulate “unreasonable risks,” a term that clearly contemplates some form of cost-
benefit balancing
All such statutes raise obvious questions: Should a life be valued at $500,000 or $10
million? What about a respiratory illness? And what is the appropriate discount rate for lives
saved and illnesses averted (say) twenty years from now? Congress has made no effort to
answer these questions. Are such measures unconstitutional unless and until the agency has
come up with a consistent method of valuation? This would be an extravagant conclusion.
— It would raise questions about much other EPA activity as well. Consider the
statute governing calculation of natural resource damages, where Congress simply refers to
factors that EPA must consider, without making them exclusive or giving them a specified
weight. Is this statute therefore unconstitutional—until the agency has undertaken the job of
weighting?
(d) Alternatives. Perhaps it would be necessary to consider a such a conclusion if
there were no alternative to the new nondelegation doctrine. But ordinary judicial review,
suitably adapted to this context, offers some promising approaches, as we will soon see.
B. The Place of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Administrative Law
None of this means that the nondelegation doctrine deserves no place in administrative
law. Indeed, some of the arguments thus far suggest a far from trivial role for the doctrine.
1. Invalidations in extreme cases. In the most extreme cases, open-ended grants of
authority should be invalidated. Schechter Poultry was rightly decided, for the statute did not
discipline executive authority, and indeed it operated as a grant of lawmaking power to private
groups. And it would not have been at all implausible to conclude, in International Union, that if
Congress is asking a regulatory agency to reduce occupational risks, it should say something
other than that standards should be “reasonably necessary or appropriate” to promote statutory32
goals. In fact the OSHA statute—outside of the area of toxic substances, where Congress added
relevant detail—was a good candidate for invalidation on nondelegation grounds.
2. Statutory construction. In other cases, the nondelegation doctrine is an appropriate
tool of construction: As between an open-ended and less open-ended understanding of agency
authority, the less open-ended interpretation should be preferred. Consider, for example, the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters case. As I have suggested, the best approach here would have
involved a recognition that the statute was designed to meet the perceived problem of “cost-
push” inflation. Congress hardly meant to give the president the authority to set wages and prices
however he chose. This would be a truly bizarre reading of the statute, taken in context.
3. Democracy-promoting minimalism: clear statement principles as nondelegation
doctrines. Perhaps most important, the nondelegation doctrine is alive and well, but it operates
under another name: “clear statement” principles. Often courts say that statutes will not be
interpreted to allow agencies to engage in certain conduct unless there has been a clear statement
of authorization from Congress. For example, it seems to be clear that agencies cannot apply
statutes extraterritorially without an express legislative decision to that effect, and courts will not
understand statutes to raise serious constitutional questions until Congress has made clear its
intention to do so; so too, statutes are not lightly taken to preempt state law.
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These ideas are best understood as narrower and more targeted versions of the
nondelegation doctrine. Unlike the standard version of that doctrine, they do not say that
Congress must legislate clearly; they do not result in the invalidation of any statute. But they do,
so that agencies will not be able to move statutes in certain contested directions on their own.
Only a deliberate and specific decision from the national legislature will suffice. By requiring
Congress to legislate with particularity on certain topics, clear statement principles serve the
same function as the nondelegation doctrine. And they do so with respect to subjects that
particularly seem to call for legislative rather than executive judgments.
C. A Punchline: Why the Clean Air Act Is Constitutional (and What It Means)
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All this helps identify the basic question that must be answered in order to decide
whether the Clean Air Act is constitutional: Does the act authorize the EPA to set standards at
whatever level it wishes? Or does it set ceilings and floors?
In answering this question, courts appropriately do whatever might reasonably be done to avoid
invalidating the act—a natural application of the general idea that whenever possible, statutes
should be construed so as to be constitutional. The central issue is therefore one of statutory
construction. In fact it is entirely possible to generate an interpretation of the statute that survives
constitutional scrutiny. The most reasonable interpretation is that EPA’s health-based judgment
(a) cannot call for regulation of small or trivial risks (such regulation would not be “requisite to
protect the public health”), and (b) must call for regulation of risks that are serious and
substantial. Thus, if the residual risk of a pollutant is trivial or de minimis—if, for example, the
risk involves minor respiratory problems but no more than that—then EPA is not obligated to
regulate it. Indeed, EPA regulation of a trivial or de minimis risk should be held unlawful, on the
ground that such regulation is not requisite to protect the public health, even with an adequate
margin of safety. If EPA seeks to reduce exposure to ground-level ozone below a level that
already ensures protection against all serious risks faced by substantial numbers of persons, it is
acting unlawfully. On the other hand, EPA is required (not merely permitted) to regulate any
substantial or significant risk. If, for example, 10,000 people are likely to die each year as a
result of exposure to a certain level of lead, EPA must act; it is not authorized to allow that level
of risk.
These points go a long way toward creating floors and ceilings and resolving the polar cases.
Suppose, for example, that existing evidence shows increased mortality risks from sulfur dioxide
at levels above .8 ppm, and increased hospital admissions at levels about .6 ppm, but no
mortality risk from sulfur dioxide levels below .4 ppm, and no increase in hospital admissions
below .4 ppm—and also that there is chronic plant injury at .1 ppm, and that respiratory
problems increase among a small, sensitive subpopulation at .15 ppm. On the facts as stated,
EPA’s discretion is confined. It could not issue a primary standard above .6 ppm or so, and it
could not issue a standard below .5 ppm or so—unless it could make extrapolations from the
evidence that would suggest a substantial risk at lower levels. Of course this is a stylized and
artificial example, and often the evidence will allow a range of reasonable judgments. But that is
a product of the uncertain science, not of any constitutional defect in the statute. Indeed, EPA34
itself has asserted that on the evidence, it was required to set the ozone standard somewhere
between .07 ppm and .09 ppm—a statement that, if true, is decisive on the nondelegation
question.
It might also be stressed that this interpretation continues to allow EPA a large deal of discretion;
for reasons stated by the American Trucking court, isn’t the statute unconstitutional even as
construed, at least unless and until the EPA can give more specificity to notions like
“substantial” and “trivial”? The answer is that the court was quite wrong on this point. The most
important precedent here is the Benzene Case itself. The OSHA statute, as construed by the
Supreme Court, requires the agency to regulate “significant” risks to the point of “feasibility,”
and neither term is defined in the statute. This does not mean that the statute is unconstitutional
until OSHA particularizes those terms. What it does mean is that any agency decision is subject
to invalidation on grounds of arbitrariness if the agency has not adequately explained itself. The
upshot: this, not delegation, was the fundamental problem in American Trucking.
My basic conclusions are that the nondelegation doctrine should be used in the most
extreme cases; that the Clean Air Act is not such a case; that the doctrine properly plays a role as
a tool of statutory construction, emphatically with the Clean Air Act; and that the work done by
the court under the rubric of the nondelegation doctrine is more reasonably done under review of
agency action for arbitrariness. It is now time to turn to the questions that remain—questions that
are not constitutional in status but that are extremely important nonetheless.
V. Options, Futures, and Clean Air
A. EPA (and OMB) on Remand: Ceilings, Floors, and “Benefits Analysis”
I have emphasized that notwithstanding its commendable detail about the underlying
evidence, the EPA’s explanation of its rule leaves much to be desired. This is not uncommon for
agency explanations in the area of safety and health; similar problems can be found in the OSHA
context and also in EPA action under other statutes. The agency’s extensive discussion is
abstract and conclusory on the key points. It does provide evidence that ozone and particulates
can have adverse effects at current levels. But it does not give a sufficiently clear sense of the35
level of those adverse effects, nor does it explain why the particular, selected regulation was
optimally suited to new information about health effects.
In issuing national ambient air quality standards, EPA should endeavor to provide a
detailed “benefits analysis,” and attempt to describe, in both qualitative and quantitative terms,
the various savings from the selected regulation and at least two alternatives, one more stringent,
the other less so. In the process EPA should identify the residual risk left by the pollutant in
question and explain why that residual risk is not above the level “requisite to protect the public
health.” The EPA should thus take steps to identify the size of the population affected, the
severity of the various risks, and the likelihood that members of any particular group will suffer
the relevant effects. To the extent possible, it should attempt to quantify each of these items. It
might say, for example, that forty million people are at risk, that ten million of these people are
under the age of eighteen, that five million are over the age of sixty, that there is a one-in-a-
thousand chance of cancer as a result of exposure, and that the relevant risks range from
respiratory problems to hospitalization and missed work-days to cancer. It should also explain
why one set of savings, thus quantified, justifies regulation, whereas another set does not.
EPA should also attempt to reduce its own discretion by showing that at least as a
presumption, risks above a certain level will not be tolerated (“risk ceilings”) and that risks
below a certain level (“risk floors”) will be acceptable. It should, in short, explain why a standard
for ozone of 0.08 is to be preferred to a standard of 0.09 or 0.07, and do so by reference to
generalizable criteria. If—as seems clear—the risks prevented by the new ozone regulation are
far smaller than the risks that would be prevented by more stringent regulation of particulates,
EPA should explain the apparent anomaly in terms of statutorily relevant factors.
In terms of intergovernmental design, it makes sense to ensure that the analysis of the
rule, and the alternatives to the rule, are developed in conjunction with another institution in the
executive branch, such as the Office of Management and Budget, which already plays a role of
this sort under Executive Order 12866. The purpose of intergovernmental review of this kind
would be to ensure a form of internal “peer review,” designed to overcome possible biases and
errors on the part of any particular bureaucracy. An external check is well suited to
accomplishing this goal.36
B. Ordinary (Not Extraordinary) Judicial Review: Democracy-Promoting Minimalism
in Practice
As I have suggested, conventional judicial review could have accommodated the
American Trucking court’s reasonable concerns. I suggest here that the appropriate approach
would be to hold both regulations invalid on the ground that the agency did not adequately
explain its choice of the particular levels that it prescribed. The most serious problem with this
approach is that it threatens excessive judicial entanglement with the rulemaking process, in a
way that would likely have unfortunate systemic effects in the form of a powerful bias toward
protecting the status quo. The best response to this concern is to choose one of the two recent
innovations in judicial review of administrative action: allowing the agency to issue an interim
rule, or (better still) remanding the regulations without vacating them.
1. Failing the hard look. A quite standard opinion would have invalidated the agency’s
rules on the ground that there was an insufficiently clear explanation of the key policy decisions.
On this view, the problem was not one of delegation, but of a lack of clarity about why lines
were drawn exactly where the EPA drew them. Why did the EPA choose 0.08 ppm rather than
0.07 ppm, or 0.06 ppm? The difficulty of answering that question in concrete terms would have
justified a remand to the agency.
This approach might be generalized. It could apply, for example, to a judgment of OSHA
that a regulation is necessary to address a “significant risk,” or to an administrative decision to
proceed against an “unreasonable risk.” In such cases, courts might require agencies to quantify
the problem that they are attempting to reduce, and explain why they chose the approach at issue
rather than one more or less stringent. A simple requirement of this kind might strengthen the
hand of technocratic and policy-analytic forces in the regulatory state, thus weakening the hand
of self-interested private groups, and also promote transparency about the relevant value
judgments.
2. Surviving a softer look. A conventional opinion, more deferential to the agency and
also reasonable, might have upheld both the ozone and the PM standards, on the ground that
neither had been shown to be arbitrary or capricious, because the agency sufficiently explained37
why the risk was less severe below the standard it set, and also why the risk was too severe at
any point above that standard. The agency did show that significant risks could be expected,
especially from particulates, from which thousands of people, on a reasonable view of the
evidence, were at risk each year. To be sure, significant challenges were made to the science
underlying both decisions. But the record contained substantial support for the EPA’s particular
choices—at least enough support to satisfy a court engaged in the ordinary scrutiny of EPA
decisions. This approach might also be generalized. For example, a court might uphold OSHA
action so long as the agency has explained why a particular risk is significant and, at least in
broad terms, why it did not select a more or less stringent alternative.
3. The problem of ossification. Both of these opinions would have been entirely
responsible, and the choice between them, both for the case at hand and for future approaches to
judicial review, is very close. If the second is to be preferred, it is not because the EPA was
necessarily doing its job well, but for reasons that go to institutional competence and that involve
the harmful systemic effects of the seemingly innocuous, one-shot remand.
With respect to systemic effects: A great deal of attention had been paid to the
phenomenon of the “ossification” of notice-and-comment rulemaking.
86 Originally intended as a
quick and effective alternative to formal, on-the-record rulemaking, executive and especially
judicial innovations have converted notice-and-comment rulemaking into an exceptionally time-
consuming affair, often extending over, frequently half a decade and more. Aggressive judicial
review contributes to these delays, and when the result is to remand a rule, the ultimate
consequence can be to discourage rulemaking altogether. The impressive study of Mashaw and
Harfst shows that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has come close to
abandoning rulemaking, largely because of the problems introduced by “hard look” judicial
review.
87 Instead of rulemaking, NHTSA acts largely by after-the-fact recalls, to which courts
are far more sympathetic. It is far from clear that American drivers are better off with this shift.
Nor is this an isolated example. Something similar appears to have happened with the Consumer
Safety Administration, and the EPA seems to have abandoned enforcement of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, largely as a result of intense judicial scrutiny of EPA activity.
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We cannot conclude that a certain judicial role is inappropriate simply because it leads to
agency inactivity. Perhaps it is good for exactly that reason. The problem is when strict judicial
supervision has the effect of freezing the status quo, whatever the status quo happens to be. This
is an unintended systemic effect of hard-look review. Particular judges, reviewing particular
rules, can be made alert to particular problems in those rules, especially when the rules are under
attack by experienced, inventive lawyers. For some rules, it is easy to imagine seemingly
decisive objections from both sides—as public interest lawyers show, quite convincingly, why a
certain rule should have been made more stringent, and as industry lawyers show, with respect to
the same rule, why greater leniency was legally mandated. Nor is this fanciful; something of the
kind has happened on several occasions in the “hard look” era.
There is no simple cure for the problem, especially in light of evidence that hard look
review has often accomplished considerable good. But it makes sense to say that in the absence
of a violation of statute, courts should not invalidate regulations unless the objection goes to the
heart of the agency’s conclusions—unless there has been a quite serious error of analysis, or
there is good reason to think that the rule will make things worse rather than better in light of
statutorily relevant criteria. Of course advice of this sort will not decide concrete questions. But
it suggests serious problems with invalidation of the EPA’s ozone and particulates regulations.
4. Procedural innovations: administrative law minimalism. Thus far a court might seem to
be in equipoise between two reasonable alternatives: a decision to uphold the regulations on the
grounds just stated, and a decision to invalidate them on the theory that the agency offered no
clear explanation of the particular level it chose. The choice between the alternatives might turn
on assessment of the systemic effects of one or another course. The danger of invalidation is that
it could greatly delay this or any other EPA rulemaking, in a way that would cause a powerful
status quo bias that could not be defended. The danger of validation is that it would allow EPA
rules that have not been persuasively defended and that might do less good than harm.
But two recent procedural innovations help resolve the dilemma and point the way to a
sensible resolution of the case. Courts of appeals now appear prepared to allow agencies to issue
“interim rules” on remand,
88 so as to ensure against the harm that may come from returning to
                                                
88 See Chemical Manufacturers v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259 (DC Cir 1994); Checkosky v. FCC, 23 F.3d 452 (DC Cir
1994); Mid-Tex Electric Cooperative v. FERC, 822 F.2d 1123 (DC Cir 1987).39
the pre-rule status quo; and courts are also prepared, in appropriate circumstances, to remand
rules without vacating them.
89 Both of these ideas are designed to ensure that rules that are
highly likely to be reasonable are not struck from the books, in a way that could produce
considerable harm. Hence, we arrive at an appropriate approach to these cases, one with general
application: the rules should be held unlawful, and remanded to the agency; but they should not
be vacated, at least when the agency can show (a) that it may be able to generate a justification
that will satisfy judicial review and (b) that invalidation of the rule may generate significant
harm (by, for example, allowing people to be exposed to nontrivial risks, or by preventing the
agency from initiating a program for reducing such risks). After the agency attempts to justify its
regulation on remand, its decision may be appealed to the court, which can evaluate the new
justification and uphold or invalidate the regulation as appropriate. The “interim rules” approach
makes best sense when the agency can show that without such rules, people will face serious
risks of one kind or another; the “remand without vacating” approach makes best sense when it
can also be shown that the agency may well be able to justify its action on remand.
There is a broader point in the background here. The techniques of remand without
invalidation, and of allowing interim rules, can be seen as a form of administrative law
“minimalism,” akin to judicial minimalism in constitutional law generally.
90 Such techniques do
no more than is necessary to resolve a case. Indeed, these forms of minimalism are democracy-
reinforcing insofar as they attempt to ensure that agency decisions are based on grounds that are
both transparent to the public and sufficient to justify the regulation in light of statutory criteria.
5. A health-health wrinkle. An important difficult question, not addressed thus far, is
raised by a particular claim with respect to EPA’s ozone regulation: that ground-level ozone has
health benefits, and that these benefits were not taken into account by the agency. There is
evidence that ozone prevents both cataracts and cancers. If taken into account, the health benefits
of ozone may well be roughly equivalent to the health costs of ozone. But the EPA refused to
consider those health benefits. In an interesting application of “health-health” analysis, the court
of appeals held that the refusal was unlawful.
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In general, it is right to say that agencies should be required to take account of the health
problems sometimes produced by regulation designed to reduce health problems. This kind of
“health-health” tradeoff can take many different forms.
91 In typical cases, the regulation of one
set of risks, like those associated with asbestos, may give rise to further risks as a result of the
substituted products. The most adventurous claims for “health-health” comparisons arise when a
costly regulation imposes health risks simply by virtue of its cost. If a regulation produces less
employment and more poverty, it may result in worse health as well. But these are adventurous
claims, because they depend on contentious projections about the disemployment effects of
particular regulations.
In the ozone rule, the argument for taking those problems into account seemed especially
insistent, for the claim was far from indirect, and there was nothing speculative or abstruse about
the causal chain. If ozone protects against cancers and cataracts, it is possible that a regulation of
ozone will cause serious health problems. The text of the act is quite ambiguous on the point, and
the court was wrong to say that it unambiguously required the agency to address the beneficial
effects of some pollutants. But the court was right to hold that even if it was ambiguous, the
agency interpretation was unreasonable. The rule was properly found inadequately explained on
this ground, and it may well be that after remand, the agency will be unable to explain its failure
to take account of the effects of ozone in combatting cataracts and cancer.
C. Congress: Safety—and its Cost
Should Congress amend the national ambient air quality provisions of the Clean Air Act?
This is not the place for an extended discussion of that question, but the analysis thus far
suggests three possibilities.
1. How safe is safe enough? As emphasized throughout, a crucial defect of the national
ambient air quality provisions is that they seem to assume that whether air is “safe” can be
assessed solely on the basis of the facts. The truth is that the facts might be able to show the
degree of risk (at least within a range), but they cannot show whether any particular degree of
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safety is “safe enough.” The result of the statutory framework is to misframe the key question
and also to give EPA little guidance for answering and asking that question. As we have seen,
EPA has greatly struggled with the resulting difficulties.
Congress should amend the statute to identify the factors for EPA to consider in making
the judgment about appropriate national standards. Congress might offer substantive guidance by
saying, for example, that the EPA must consider risk severity, size of affected population, and
likelihood of adverse effects at various exposure levels. On the procedural side, it might require
EPA to identify, to the extent possible, the nature of the risks that it is reducing, and at the same
time to attempt to quantify the relevant risk reductions. The strongest argument against an
amendment to this effect is that it is unnecessary; if the EPA moved in the directions suggested
above, it would essentially be interpreting the current statute as if it contained instructions of
exactly this sort. But an amendment of this kind would at least provide a clear legislative signal
and move EPA judgments in the direction of greater transparency.
2. More flexible tools. We now know that significant cost savings can be achieved by
using more flexible, market-oriented instruments. Sometimes, however, the EPA does not choose
such instruments even when it is legally authorized to do so.
92 It would make sense to amend the
statute to require the EPA, wherever feasible, to use economic incentives rather than a
“command-and-control” approach.
93 It is clear that an approach of this kind could save
substantial resources, and if the instruments are properly chosen, it should do so without at the
same time compromising air-quality goals.
94 An effort to encourage the EPA to select less
burdensome alternatives could send a desirable signal to attempt the least-cost methods of
obtaining regulatory goals, and might in addition spur creative experimentation.
3. Cost and benefits. A possible lesson of EPA experience with national standards is that
EPA should be required, or at least permitted, to consider costs when setting such standards.
Indeed, it is far from clear that the statute should be construed to forbid cost-benefit analysis
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from EPA,
95 though lower courts have unanimously concluded otherwise. If the Supreme Court
does not reject the lower court’s view, it is worth giving serious consideration to a statutory
change.
The basic reasoning here is straightforward. If a reduction from 0.8 to 0.7 would be a
trivial expense, surely it should be required; if it would cost billions of dollars, there had better
be good grounds to believe in very substantial health benefits. A possible argument to the
contrary is that national standards operate as aspirations, not ordinary law, and aspirations, at
least, should be set on a health-only basis—not because there is a magic place where air quality
is “safe,” but because it is valuable to obtain, and use, a technocratic judgment that people should
have air quality of a certain specified sort. The problem with this view is that it is impossible to
assess “safety” in a cost-vacuum.  The best defense of a failure to require cost-benefit analysis is
that the statute actually allows costs to be considered in implementation; consider the
extraordinary delays in bringing about compliance, delays that might be defended as a form of
implicit cost-benefit balancing. But this pragmatic defense of the current statute runs into a
serious problem; it suggests that the statute is a form of deception, allowing cost-benefit analysis
while purporting to forbid it.
VI. Conclusion
The most serious problem with the EPA’s performance in issuing national air quality
standards is that it often fails to explain, in understandable terms, its decision to require any
particular level of ambient air quality. Sometimes it has acted as if it were pursuing “safety” and
ensuring “safe levels,” without sufficiently acknowledging that for most pollutants, the serious
question is what degree of safety. To its credit, the EPA invariably offers extensive discussions
of the underlying data, demonstrating that there is a genuine health risk at current levels. But to
the extent that it provides an explanation of its particular choices, the discussion often involves
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not much more than evidence of nontrivial adverse effects at those current levels—evidence that
may well argue for a reduction from current levels but does not by itself call for any particular
regulatory standard.
The Clean Air Act should not be held unconstitutional, and EPA should not be required,
on pain of constitutional invalidation, to come up with a “generic unit of harm” to encompass
population affected, severity, and probability. On the other hand, ordinary judicial review should
require any national ambient air quality standard to be accompanied by an adequate explanation
of why that level, rather than one more or less stringent, has been selected. By itself, this
requirement calls (to the extent feasible) for a high degree of quantification from EPA; it also
suggests that the EPA should compare the chosen alternative to at least two reasonable
alternatives, and explain why the chosen alternative is preferable. This approach bears on the
performance of other regulatory agencies entrusted with the task of promoting health and safety.
Courts should generally implement requirements of this kind by remanding rules without
invalidating them. But they should invalidate, and not merely remand, where the agency is
unable to offer an explanation of its choice of one level of regulation rather than another.
My principal claim here is that both courts and the EPA should construe the act so as to
prevent regulation of small risks and so as to require regulation of substantial risks—and the
EPA should explain, as quantitatively as possible, what must be shown in order for a risk to
qualify, or not to qualify, as substantial. It is excessive, a form of rhetoric, to say that on the
EPA’s view, it is entitled to choose any level between zero risk and a level slightly below
London’s “killer fog.” But it is not a form of rhetoric to think that if the EPA has not limited its
own discretion by speaking in less conclusory terms, the Clean Air Act raises problems for both
regulatory policy and democratic self-government. The ultimate goal of the form of democracy-
promoting minimalism that I have endorsed here would be to ensure better policy analysis and
greater transparency of decision, in a way that should simultaneously promote democratic,
economic, and air quality goals.44
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